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Abstract
We examine how a merger aﬀects wages of unionized labour
and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under both Cournot
and Bertrand competition. If unions are plant-specific, we find
that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model
with exogenous wages. In contrast to the received literature, we
find that it can be more profitable to take part in a merger than
being an outsider. For firm-specific unions, on the other hand,
results are reversed.
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1 Introduction
Empirical literature suggests that mergers may aﬀect wages (see e.g.
Peoples et al., 1993, and McGuckin et al., 1995). Despite this evidence,
the theoretical literature on mergers does not investigate any possible
links between mergers and wages. It is mainly concerned with how a
merger aﬀects the rivalry between firms. The purpose of this paper is to
help filling this gap by analyzing mergers in a unionized oligopoly. The
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structure of the labor market is crucial for the profitability of a merger
and for whether a non-merging firm earns more from a merger than a
merging firm. We argue that this has important implications not only
for firms’ business strategies, but also for anti-trust policy as well as the
empirical testing of possible links between mergers and wages.
In a seminal paper, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) show that in
a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous goods, linear demand and con-
stant marginal costs, a merger is unprofitable unless the merging coali-
tion consists of more than 80 per cent of all firms in the industry. More
recent studies have shown how a relaxation of some of the assumptions
in Salant et al. (1983) may restore the perhaps more intuitive result
that mergers are most often profitable. This could be done by, on the
demand side, introducing diﬀerentiated products or by, on the cost side,
adding a capital stock that aﬀects marginal costs.1 Finally, Deneckere
and Davidson (1985) show that the result in Salant et al. (1983) can
also be reversed by changing the nature of competition. They examine
the case of diﬀerentiated products and price competition, and find that
a merger is always profitable in such a setting. Predictions from theory
are then that a merger without any costs savings is typically profitable
under Bertrand competition, and typically unprofitable under Cournot
competition unless products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.2
More clear-cut is the theory’s prediction concerning the insiders’ ver-
sus the outsiders’ gain from a merger. As far as we know, no studies find
that it is more profitable to be one of the merging firms than to be one
of the non-merging firms. One could then argue that each firm should
wait, hoping that other firms merge and then be a free rider on such a
merger.3
1As anticipated in Deneckere and Davidson (1985) and shown in Lommerud and
Sørgard (1997), a merger is more profitable if the products are diﬀerentiated than
what is the case with homogeneous products. On the cost side, it is shown that by
assuming that the capital stock aﬀects marginal costs a merger is more profitable
than what is the case with constant marginal costs. This is shown in, for instance,
Perry and Porter (1985) and McAfee and Williams (1992).
2Several studies try to explain unprofitable mergers and acquisitions. Faulí-Oller
and Motta (1996) show that unprofitable mergers can occur in a setting with strategic
delegation of decisions to managers. Shleifer and Vishny (1988) argue that managers
with other motives than value maximization, such as the size of their organization,
can trigger unprofitable mergers. Roll (1986) argues that those overestimating their
ability most are also most likely to buy a firm (winner’s curse). Nilssen and Sørgard
(1998) and Fridolfsson and Stennek (2000b) show that a merger that is unprofitable
seen in isolation may be undertaken either to prevent or to encourage future mergers.
3This free rider problem was first pointed out in Stigler (1950). Fridolfsson and
Stennek (2000a) show that this mechanism may delay a merger rather than prevent
it completely.
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In this paper we examine how the referred predictions from the es-
tablished literature may change when we let labor be an input to produc-
tion and let wages (and employment) be endogenously determined.4 Our
model is in much the same spirit as Salant et al. (1983) and Deneckere
and Davidson (1985). We apply a model of diﬀerentiated products, with
Salant et al.’s homogeneous goods model as a special case, and we in-
vestigate both Cournot and Bertrand competition. The results in the
literature are reproduced in a benchmark version of our model, where
wages - the firms’ input prices - are exogenous.
In the model, labor is the only input to production and the work-
ers are organized in unions that are concerned about both wages and
employment.5 In the basic version of the model we apply a monopoly
union model, a special version of the right-to-manage model, where the
unions set wages and the firms set employment. For our perhaps most
interesting case, though, we contrast our findings with the predictions
from an eﬃcient bargaining model.
We distinguish between three diﬀerent ways to organize the labor
market: the unions can either be plant-specific, firm-specific or central.
In the latter case all workers in the industry are organized in one union.
The central monopoly union is then not only a monopolist in the labor
market, but a back-seat monopolist in the product market as well. A
merger is irrelevant for wage setting in such a context, because what
matters is product market demand. The results from the standard lit-
erature still apply.
If we introduce a plant-specific union, the results change dramat-
ically. A plant-specific union organizes only the workers at one plant.
Then a merger between two firms does not change the number of unions,
but it changes the rivalry between them. The two merged firms’ unions
compete more fiercely on wages to serve the merged firm. Furthermore,
the initial reduction in sales would imply that employment suﬀers. The
union will want to set a low wage as a response to a merger to dampen
the reduction in employment. We find that under Bertrand competition
a merger is as usual profitable, and even more so than with exogenous
4González-Maestre and López-Cuñat (1999) is a study in much the same spirit
as ours. They analyse merger in a homogeneous Cournot model where each owner
delegates output decisions to a manager. The manager’s incentive scheme, which
is endogenous in the model and thereby aﬀected by a merger, can be regarded as
a wage. Since the incentive scheme is set by the owner, their setting is distinctly
diﬀerent from ours where we have unions that can bargain over wage (and possibly
employment).
5The literature on unionized oligopoly is quite sizeable; see for example Brander
and Spencer (1988), Dowrick (1989), Naylor (1998) and Lommerud and Sørgard
(1999). There is no mention of mergers in these papers.
3
wages. More interestingly and in contrast to the standard literature, a
merger is now profitable even for Cournot competition and homogeneous
goods unless the unions are very employment-oriented. An employment-
oriented union would imply that wages are close to the competitive level
initially, so that a merger has only a limited eﬀect on wages.
We show that the merging firm’s wages are always lower than the non-
merging firms’ wages. We find that under both Cournot and Bertrand
competition a merger can be more profitable for a merging than for a
non-merging firm. This holds if the unions are suﬃciently wage-oriented.
If the unions are firm- rather than plant-specific, our results are re-
versed. If firm-specific unions, a merger between two firms implies that
the merging firms’ unions also merge. Then we have a higher concen-
tration in the labor market, which dampens the rivalry between the
unions. In this case a merger results in higher wages, and the merging
firms now face higher wages than the non-merging firms. No surprise,
then, a merger is now less profitable than in the case with exogenous
wages. We find that now a merger is unprofitable under Cournot com-
petition unless the products are very diﬀerentiated and the unions are
extremely employment oriented. Under Bertrand competition, a merger
is now profitable only if products are suﬃciently close substitutes and the
unions are suﬃciently employment oriented. Since wages increase more
for the merging than the non-merging firms, an outsider earns more from
a merger than a participant. Thus, we see that the traditional result in
the literature is restored in this respect.
Monopoly union models are often contrasted with the assumption of
eﬃcient bargaining between firms and unions. We do this for the case
of plant-specific unions. Even though details change, the basic result
remains that unions tend to make mergers more profitable and that it
becomes more profitable to participate in the merger than to remain on
the outside.
The distinction between plant-specific and firm-specific bargaining
has turned out to be very important. A natural question is when which
model best describes a particular industry. We think international merg-
ers, which gain in importance, point towards the plant-specific union
model. Trade unions tend not to transcend national borders. Moreover,
when the oligopoly in question produces diﬀerentiated goods, decentral-
ized bargaining can imply something close to plant-specific unionism.
The plant-specific union model should then be more relevant for a US or
UK setting, while the firm-specific model might better fit the situation
in Scandinavia and many countries in continental Europe.
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2 Some preliminaries
Consider an oligopoly industry that consists of three firms, each produc-
ing one brand of a diﬀerentiated product. Let firm i produce brand i
in quantity qi. There is no entry or threat of entry, and firms are either
price setters (Bertrand) or quantity setters (Cournot). Firms 1 and 2 are
the merger candidates, and we assume that the merged firm continues to
produce two brands (1 and 2), making it ’larger’ than either of the pre-
merger firms. The outsider (firm 3) continues to produce one brand (3).
Let us here first show the results found in a benchmark model without
unions, and then introduce unions.
A benchmark
Demand for the diﬀerentiated product is characterised by a symmet-
ric demand system, where the inverse demand function for brand 1 is
given by
p1 = 1− q1 − b (q2 + q3) (1)
with a corresponding structure for the inverse demand functions for the
other brands. The parameter b ∈ h0, 1i is a measure of substitutability
in demand. If b → 0 the brands are regarded as (almost) unrelated,
whereas b→ 1 corresponds to the case of (almost) homogeneous goods.
Labor is the only factor of production, and each worker supplies one
unit of labor to the firm at a price w per unit (wage). We assume that
the labor force is homogeneous and that diﬀerent brands are produced
by using the same production technology, so that the only factor that
ties a certain brand to a firm is patent rights.
We adopt a very simple linear production function, given by
qi = li (2)
where qi is total quantity produced (of brand i) by firm i, and li is the
total amount of labor employed by firm i. In this case, output and
employment are equivalent.
As a benchmark for later comparison, consider the following result:
Lemma 1 If wages are exogenous, a merger is always profitable under
Bertrand competition and profitable under Cournot competition if b <
0.55, and more profitable for the outsider than for a participant.
Proof Results concerning Bertrand competition follows directly
from Deneckere and Davidson (1985), and for Cournot competition it
follows directly from Lommerud and Sørgard (1997). ¥
5
As first shown in Deneckere and Davidson (1985), a merger in a
Bertrand oligopoly allows the merging firms to coordinate their price
setting and thereby raise prices which, in turn, triggers the outsiders
to increase prices as well. The response from the outsiders to a merger
would then add to the profitability of the initial price coordination fol-
lowing a merger.
Under Cournot competition, the outsiders’ response is distinctly dif-
ferent. An outsider’s best response to a reduction in sales by the merg-
ing firm is to increase its sales, thereby reducing the profitability of a
merger. As shown in Salant et al. (1983), for the case of homogeneous
products, the eﬀect of the outsiders’ response may dominate so that a
merger is unprofitable. However, each outsider’s response is dampened if
products are diﬀerentiated. This explains why merger can be profitable
under Cournot competition if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.
Irrespective of the nature of competition, the outsider will be a free
rider on the merger. It will experience higher prices and higher sales.
It will gain more from the merger than the insiders, who experience a
reduction in sales.
Unions
Let us now introduce unions. They are characterised by identical
Stone-Geary utility functions, given by
Ui = (wi −w)θ (li)1−θ (3)
where the parameter θ ∈ h0, 1i captures the relative importance of wages
and employment to the unions.6 The reservation wage, w, is equal to
the wage that could be earned in the competitive sector of the economy.
For simplicity, w will be normalized to zero.
In the literature, there are diﬀerent ways of modeling employment
decisions and wage setting. On the one hand, one could argue that
unions often have more power over wage setting than over employment
decisions. In line with this reasoning, one could apply a right-to-manage
model where union and firm bargain over the wage level, but the firm
alone sets employment. On the other hand, bargaining over both wages
and employment may emerge as an equilibrium outcome in infinitely
repeated games (see Espinosa and Rhee, 1989). This is an argument for
applying an eﬃcient bargaining model, where the union has the same
relative bargaining strength over wage setting as employment decisions
(and possibly other relevant decision variables).
6θ is a measure of the labor market distortion caused by unions. When θ → 0 the
wage approaches the competitive level. θ is assumed to be equal for all unions.
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In addition, strategic product market interactions strongly influence
the players’ preferred mode of bargaining. In fact, the existing literature
suggests that the bargaining game that will emerge as the equilibrium
outcome depends on the characteristics of the industry in question.7
We sidestep from the debate over modeling approach by applying
both bargaining models. In the basic model we assume that wages are
set by unions, while firms set employment. This is called a monopoly
union model, and it is that special case of the right-to-manage model
where the union has all the bargaining power. For the case of plant-
specific unions, we contrast the findings with the results from an eﬃcient
bargaining model.8
We distinguish between plant-specific, firm-specific and central unions.
In the former case, wages are set at plant levels. Then a merged firm will
face two unions after a merger, one for each of the two merging firms. In
contrast, firm-specific unions imply that the two merged firms’ unions
become one union following a merger. Then a merger implies a more
centralized wage setting. Finally, a central union is one which organizes
the workers of all firms in a given oligopoly.
A central union will set the wage
w = θ (4)
regardless of the number of firms in the industry, and regardless of
whether the market game is Cournot or Bertrand.9 Then we have the
following result:
Lemma 2 If the wage is set by a central union, a merger will not
influence the wages and the results in Lemma 1 are still valid.
A central monopoly union can drive an oligopoly from the back-seat,
so-to-speak. It controls the strategic interaction among firms by having
the ability to fix the marginal production costs of all the participants. By
7Two recent contributions in the literature illustrate the ambiguity. Bughin (1999)
finds that eﬃcient bargaining is the most likely equilibrium outcome, even more so
under the threat of entry. Petrakis and Vlassis (2000) finds that right-to-manage
bargaining is the equilibrium outcome if the unions’ bargaining power is suﬃciently
high.
8Manning (1987) brings out the important structural diﬀerences between various
trade union models in an illuminating way.
9This result does not hinge on the assumption of linear demand. Under the
assumption of constant elasticity of demand, Dowrick (1989) shows that if the union
is organised on an industry-wide basis, the wage is independent of the degree of
product market competitiveness, while Riley (1995) shows that this result holds for a
general demand function, i.e., the elasticity of industry labour demand is independent
of the degree of product market competition.
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increasing wages, product prices will have to increase and employment
will fall. What matters for wage setting is only product market demand
and the union’s own relative preference for wage over employment. A
merger is irrelevant for wage setting in this context.
In the two remaining cases, though, we will show that a merger does
aﬀect wages. We apply the following rules of the game in the basic model
with monopoly unions:
Stage 1: The firms merge or not
Stage 2: The unions set wages
Stage 3: The firms set prices (Bertrand) or quantity (Cournot)
Note that employment is indirectly determined at stage 3 of the game,
when the firms set prices or quantity. Alternatively, the unions and the
firms bargain over wages and employment at stage 2 of the game. We
return to this case in Section 5, when applying an eﬃcient bargaining
model in a setting with plant-specific unions.
3 Plant-specific unions
The number of active unions are in this case left unchanged by a merger.
The oligopoly game in the product markets takes place either with three
or two participants. In the pre-merger game, firm i chooses either li or
pi, depending on which is the strategic variable, to maximize
πi = (pi − wi) li (5)
where wi is the wage set by firm i’s union, which maximizes
Ui = (wi)
θ (li)
1−θ (6)
In the post-merger game, the merged firm chooses either l1 and l2, or p1
and p2, to maximize
πm = (p1 − w1) l1 + (p2 − w2) l2 (7)
where w1 is the wage set by the union at plant 1, and w2 is the wage set
by the union at plant 2. These unions set their wages simultaneously by
maximizing, respectively,
U1 = (w1)
θ (l1)
1−θ (8)
and
U2 = (w2)
θ (l2)
1−θ (9)
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3.1 Cournot
Under Cournot competition, wages and profits in the symmetric pre-
merger Nash equilibrium are given by10
wC =
θ (2− b)
2 + b− 2θb (10)
πC = (2 + b)
2 (1− θ)2
4 (1 + b)2 (2 + b− 2θb)2
(11)
In the asymmetric post-merger Nash equilibrium wages and profits
are given by
wC1 = w
C
2 =
2θ (2− b+ θb− 2b2 − θb2 + b3)
η (12)
wC3 =
θ (4− b2 − 5θb2 + 2θb3)
η (13)
πCm =
(1− θ)2 (2− b)2 (2 + b)2 (b+ 1) (2 + b+ θb− b2)2
2 (2 + 2b− b2)2 η2
(14)
πC3 =
(1− θ)2 (1 + b)2 (4− b2 − 5θb2 + 2θb3)2
(2 + 2b− b2)2 η2
(15)
where
η = 4 + 4b− 4θb− b2 − 3θb2 − 2θ2b2 − b3 + θb3 + 2θ2b3 > 0
We then have the following result:
Lemma 3 (i) wC3 > wC if θ < 12 or b is suﬃciently low.
(ii) wC > wC1 = w
C
2 .
(iii) wC3 > w
C
1 = w
C
2 .
Proof (i) From (10) and (13), wC3 > wC if
θb2 (1− θ) (4− 4θ − 4θb+ 2θb2 − b2)
η (2 + b− 2θb) > 0.
10 In what follows, variables without any subscript refer to pre-merger equilibrium
values, while variables with subscript refer to post-merger equilibrium values. Fur-
ther, variables with superscript C and B refer to the case of Cournot and Bertrand
competition, respectively.
9
The denominator is obviously positive for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i.The numera-
tor is positive if (4− 4θ − 4θb+ 2θb2 − b2) > 0. Rearranging yields
4 (1− θ (1 + b)) + b2 (2θ − 1) > 0. We see that this condition holds
if θ < 1
2
or if b is suﬃciently low.
(ii) From (10) and (12), wC > wC1 = wC2 reduces to
θb (1− θ) (4 + 4b− b2 − b3 − 2θb2 (1− b))
(2 + b− 2θb) η > 0.
which holds for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i.
(iii) From (12) and (13), wC3 > wC1 = wC2 reduces to
θb (2b+ 1) (2− b) (1− θ)
η > 0
which is true for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i. ¥
The merging firms’ wages fall, while the wage set by the outsider’s
union will increase or decrease, depending on union preferences and the
degree of product diﬀerentiation. Importantly, though, the merged firm
always faces lower wages than do the outsider.
A merger would, ceteris paribus, result in lower sales for the merg-
ing parties. This is bad news for workers in the merging firms, since
employment suﬀers. The two unions in the merging firms will respond
by reducing wages and thereby soften the reduction in employment. In
addition, a merger triggers competition between the two unions supply-
ing workers to the merged firm.11 This tends to reduce the wage even
further. It is important to emphasise, though, that the wage-reducing
eﬀect of intensified inter-union competition is always dominant. It can
be shown that if the unions are wage oriented, i.e. if θ is relatively high,
a merger would trigger an expansion of sales by the merging firms. This
is due to the fact that pre-merger profits, as well as output, are low,
making it profitable for the merging firms to increase output as a re-
sponse to a decrease in wages. Thus, if θ is suﬃciently high, the rivalry
in the labor market triggered by the merger results in lower wages and
higher employment in the merging firms.
Absent unions, a non-merging firm would increase sales following a
merger. This suggests that the union in the non-merging firm would re-
spond to a merger by increasing wages and thereby have both increased
11To understand this, note that the merged firm is very responsive to a wage
reduction by one of its two unions. It could reshuﬄe its total sales by reducing
production supplied by the high-wage union and increasing production supplied by
the low-wage union. This triggers fierce competition on wages between the two
unions.
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Figure 1: Merger profitability with plant-specific unions under Cournot
competition.
wages and increased employment following the merger. However, as ex-
plained above, if unions are suﬃciently wage oriented, the inter-union
rivalry following a merger may result in an expansion of sales by the
merging firms. If so, the non-merging firm would face a lower sale fol-
lowing a merger. The union’s best response would then be to lower
its wage. We see from Lemma 3 that this is true if the products are
suﬃciently close substitutes, implying that the spillover eﬀect on the
non-merging firm from a sales increase by the merging firm is large.
However, due to the intensified rivalry between the merging firms’
unions, the wage reduction is always larger in the merged firm than in
non-merged firm.
Proposition 1 Under Cournot competition and plant-specific monopoly
unions, a merger is (i) always profitable for the participants unless b >
0.55 and θ is close to zero, and (ii) more profitable for a participant than
for the outsider if the unions are not too employment oriented.
Proof (i) A merger is profitable if πCm − 2πC > 0. From Lemma 1
we know that this is true if θ = 0 and b < 0.55. Setting b = 1, we can
from (11) and (14) find that πCm − 2πC > 0 if:
−9 + 138θ − 127θ2 + 8θ3(1 + θ)
72(2θ − 3)2 > 0.
This condition is met if θ > 0.07. Then we know that for θ ∈ h0, 1i
and b ∈ h0.55, 1i there are critical values where πCm = 2πC . In Figure
1 we have plotted the curve where πCm = 2πC in a (θ, b)-diagram, using
the expressions in (11) and (14). It follows immediately that πCm > 2πC
above the curve.
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Figure 2: Insider versus outsider profitability of a merger with plant-
specific unions under Cournot competition.
(ii) A participant earns πCm/2 and the non-merging firm πC3 in the
post-merger equilibrium. We know from Lemma 1 that for θ = 0, then
πCm − 2πC3 < 0. Setting b = 1 and using the expressions reported in (14)
and (15), we have that πCm − 2πC3 < 0 if 20θ − 7θ2 > 4. This condition
is met if θ < 0.21. Then we know that for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i there are critical
values where πCm−2πC3 = 0. In Figure 2 we have plotted the curve where
πCm = 2πC3 in a (θ, b)-diagram, using the expressions in (14) and (15).
Obviously, πCm > 2πC3 above the curve . ¥
We see from the Proposition that the results in the received literature
- referred to in Lemma 1 - is reproduced when θ approaches zero. This is
the case where the union in the limit is concerned only about employment
and not about wages and thus wages approach the competitive level.
Then a merger (in the limit) has no eﬀect on wages, and it is profitable
only if the products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (b < 0.55).
When θ > 0, wage matters for the unions. They are then concerned
about both wages and employment. It turns out that there is a hump-
shaped relationship between θ and post-merger wage responses. This, in
turn, determines a similar relationship between θ and merger profitabil-
ity. For low levels of θ, pre-merger wages are close to the competitive
level, and there is not much room for wage reductions. As θ increases,
though, the larger is the wage reduction following a merger, increasing
the profitability for the merger participants. However, for very high val-
ues of θ, the unions have a strong preference for high wages, and even
though there are considerable room for wage reductions, a merger will
only trigger small adjustments in wages. Nevertheless, for values of θ
close to 1, even a marginal reduction in post-merger wages will make a
merger profitable for the participants. As shown in Figure 1, a merger is
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profitable even if products are (almost) identical if θ is above a certain
treshold level.
From Lemma 3 we know that the wage reduction following a merger
is always larger in the merged firm than in the non-merged firm. This
helps explain the result illustrated in Figure 2: A merging firm gains
more from a merger than what is the case for the non-merged firm when
the unions are suﬃciently wage-oriented. This is in contrast to the result
in the received literature. As far as we know, in all theoretical studies it
is found that the profitability of a merger is larger for an outsider than
for an insider.
3.2 Bertrand
If the nature of competion in the product market is characterised by
Bertrand competition, wages and profits in the symmetric pre-merger
Nash equilibrium are given by
wB =
θ (2 + b− 3b2)
(2 + 3b− 2θb− 2θb2 − b2) (16)
πB = (1− b) (1 + b) (1− θ)
2 (2 + 3b− b2)2
4 (1 + 2b) (2 + 3b− 2θb− 2θb2 − b2)2
(17)
In the asymmetric post-merger Nash equilibrium wages and profits
are given by
wB1 = w
B
2 =
2θ (1− b)α
β (18)
wB3 =
θ (1− b) ρ
β (19)
πBm =
(1− b) (1− θ)2 (4 + 8b+ b2 − 2b3)2 α2
2 (1 + 2b) (2 + 2b− b2)2 β2
(20)
πB3 =
(1− b2) (1− θ)2 (1 + b− b2)2 ρ2
(1 + 2b) (2 + 2b− b2)2 β2
(21)
where
β = 4 + 12b− 4θb+ 5b2 − 9θb2 − 2θ2b2 − 9b3
+θb3 − 2θ2b3 − 3b4 + 7θb4 + 2b5 − 2θb5 > 0
α = 2 + 5b+ θb+ b2 + 2θb2 − 3b3 + θb3 > 0
ρ = 4 + 12b+ 9b2 − 3θb2 − b3 − 3θb3 − 2b4 + 2θb4 > 0
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We then have the following results:
Lemma 4 (i) wB > wB1 = wB2 .
(ii) wB3 > w
B
1 = w
B
2 .
(iii) wB3 > w
B unless b and θ are close to 1.
Proof (i) From (16) and (18), wB > wB1 = wB2 reduces to
θb (1− θ) (2b+ 1) (1− b)A
(2 + 3b− 2θb− b2 − 2θb2)B> 0
where A = 4 + 8b + 3b4 − 2b3θ − 7b3 − 3b2 − 2θb2 > 0 and B =
(1 + b− b2) (4 + 8b+ b2 − 2b3)−θb (4 + 9b+ 2θb− b2 + 2θb2 − 7b3 + 2b4).
The numerator is obviously positive for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i. We can also see
that the denominator is ’least positive’ if θ → 1. Inserting θ = 1 yields
2
¡
2 + b− 3b2
¢
(1− b) (2b+ 1)
¡
2 + 2b− b2
¢
which is positive for b ∈ h0, 1i. Thus the denominator is also positive for
θ, b ∈ h0, 1i.
(ii)From (18) and (19), wB3 > wB1 = wB2 reduces to
θ (1− b) b (2b+ 1) (2 + 3b− b2) (1− θ)
β > 0.
which is true for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i.
(iii) From (16) and (19), wB3 > wB reduces to
θb2 (1− θ) (1 + 2b) (1− b)C
(2 + 3b− 2θb− b2 − 2θb2)β > 0
where C = 4+ 8b+2b3θ+ b2− 2b3− 2θb2− 8θb− 4θ. The denominator
is obviously positive for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i, while the sign of the numerator
depends on the sign of C. A closer inspection of C reveals that C > 0,
implying that the numerator is also positive, unless b and θ are close to
1. ¥
We see from Lemma 4 that under Bertrand competition the merging
firms’ post-merger equilibrium wages will always fall. The outsider, on
the other hand, faces higher post-merger wages, unless the products are
very close substitutes and the unions are very wage oriented. It will
always be the case, though, that the merged firm faces lower wages than
the outsider. By comparing with Lemma 3, we see that the results are
quite similar with the case of Cournot competition. The intuition for
the results here is analogous to the intuition we gave for the results in
Lemma 3.
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Figure 3: Insider versus outsider profitability of a merger with plant-
specific unions under Bertrand competition.
Proposition 2 Under Bertrand competition and plant-specific monopoly
unions, a merger is (i) always profitable for the participants, and (ii)
more profitable for a participant than for the outsider if the unions are
not too employment oriented.
Proof: (i) We know from Lemma 1 that for exogenous wages πBm >
2πB. Given the results shown in Lemma 4, it is trivial to see that
πBm > 2πB in this setting as well.
(ii) We know that for θ = 0, πBm < 2πB3 . By using the expressions in
(20) and (21), it can be shown that πBm = 2πB3 for diﬀerent combinations
of θ, b ∈ h0, 1i. In Figure 3 we have shown the curve where πBm = 2πB3 in
a (θ, b)-diagram. Obviously, above the curve πBm > 2πB3 . ¥
We know from Lemma 1 that if wages are exogenous, then a merger
is always profitable under Bertrand competition. As shown in Lemma
4, wages fall in the merged firm following a merger and it falls more
than what is the case for the non-merging firms. It is then obvious that
a merger is profitable for the merging parties in this setting, and even
more so than in the case of exogenous wages.
More interestingly, we find that a merger can be more profitable
for an insider than for an outsider. This is the case if the unions are
suﬃciently wage oriented. The range of parameter values of θ and b
for which such a result is found is shown in Figure 3. By comparing
with Figure 2, we see that this result mirrors the result we found under
Cournot competition. The intuition for the result is, as was the case
under Cournot competition, that the initial drop in employment in the
merged firm as well as the rivalry between the unions triggered by the
merger, result in a larger wage reduction in the merged firm than in the
non-merged firm.
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4 Firm-specific unions
If unions are organized at firm level, a merger between two or more firms
will implicitly lead to a higher degree of centralization in wage setting,
since the merged firm only confronts one union in the post-merger game.
In the second stage of the post-merger game, the merged firm chooses
either l1 and l2, or p1 and p2, to maximize
πm = (p1 − wm) l1 + (p2 − wm) l2 (22)
where wm is the wage set by the merged firm’s union, which maximizes
Um = (wm)
θ (l1 + l2)
1−θ (23)
4.1 Cournot
The pre-merger equilibrium outcome, in terms of wages and profits, is
given by (10)-(11).
In the asymmetric post-merger Nash equilibrium wages and profits
are given by
wCm =
θ (2 + b+ θb− b2)
2 + 2b− θ2b2
(24)
wC3 =
θ (2 + 2θb− θb2)
2 + 2b− θ2b2
(25)
πCm =
2 (1− θ)2 (1 + b) (2 + b+ θb− b2)2¡
2 + 2b− θ2b2
¢2
(2 + 2b− b2)2
(26)
πC3 =
(1− θ)2 (1 + b)2 (2 + 2θb− θb2)2¡
2 + 2b− θ2b2
¢2
(2 + 2b− b2)2
(27)
Comparing the two equilibria we find the following result:
Lemma 5 wCm > w
C
3 > w
C.
Proof From (10), (20) and (21), and after rearranging, wCm > wC3
reduces to
θb (1− b) (1− θ)¡
2 + 2b− θ2b2
¢ > 0
while wC3 > w
C reduces to
θb2 (1− θ) (2 + 2θ − θb)¡
2 + 2b− θ2b2
¢
(2 + b− 2θb)
> 0
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It can easily be seen that both inequalities hold for b, θ ∈ h0, 1i. ¥
After the merger, equilibrium wages increase for both the insiders
and the outsider, but the merged firm faces a higher wage than the
outsider. Comparing with Lemma 3, the results are reversed when we
go from plant-specific to firm-specific unions.
At first glance, the result in Lemma 5 may come as a surprise. As was
the case for plant-specific unions, the merging firm would, all else equal,
reduce sales and thereby reduce employment following a merger. We
would expect the union to lower wages, so that it could have both lower
wages and lower employment. However, in this case the merger between
the firms also implies that the two unions merge. This increase in cen-
tralization, from three to two unions, dampens the rivalry between the
unions and thereby tends to increase wages. As shown in Lemma 5, this
dampening-of-competition eﬀect in the labor market more than oﬀsets
the tendency to lower wages to dampen the reduction in employment.
Note the diﬀerence between plant-specific and firm-specific unions.
The former cares only for employment at its own plant. Then there is a
tendency that unions undercut each other in the wage setting, to capture
a larger number of jobs for their own plant. A firm-specific union cares
for the employment level at both the two plants in a merged firm, which
reduces the tendency to undercut wages.
After the merger, there is an asymmetry between the firms. The
merging firm oﬀers two brands while the non-merging firm oﬀers one
brand. The firm-specific union in the merged firm then internalizes the
externality between the brands. An increase in output price triggered
by an increase in wages will now imply that some of the sales of one
brand are reshuﬄed to the other brand oﬀered by the merged firm and
thereby employment is partly reshuﬄed within the merged firm. Due to
this the merged firm’s union increases the wage more than the union in
the non-merged firm does.
Proposition 3 Under Cournot competition and firm-specific monopoly
unions, a merger is (i) profitable for the participants only if b < 0.55
and θ is close to zero, and (ii) more profitable for the outsider than for
a participant.
Proof (i) We know from Lemma 1 that if θ = 0, then πCm > 2πC if
b < 0.55. Then we know that there are combinations of θ, b ∈ h0, 1i such
that πCm = 2πC. By using the expressions in (11) and (26), we find these
combinations of θ and b. They are plotted in a (θ, b)-diagram in Figure
4. Obviously, above the curve shown in Figure 4 πCm < 2πC.
17
Figure 4: Merger profitability with firm-specific unions under Cournot
competition.
(ii) We know from Lemma 1 that for exogenous wages, πCm < 2πC3 .
Given the result in Lemma 5, it is trivial to see that the result in Lemma
1 applies in this case too. ¥
In Figure 4 we have shown the set of parameter values for which the
merger is profitable for the participants. We see that except for a few
combinations of low θ and low b, a merger is unprofitable. It suggests
that for a merger to be profitable in the presence of firm-specific unions
we have to impose extremely strong additional assumptions regarding
union preferences. This is no surprise, given that a merger triggers a
wage increase in the merged firm and this wage increase is larger than
the one in the non-merged firm. By comparing with Figure 2, we see
the importance of the union structure. While it is very likely that a
merger is profitable under Cournot competition if we have plant-specific
unions, it is very unlikely that a corresponding merger in an industry
with firm-specific unions is profitable.
Note also from part (ii) of Proposition 3 that in this case it is better
being the outsider than being a participant in the merger. This is in
contrast to our results with plant-specific unions. However, it is in line
with the results in the received literature. Since we know that a merger
with exogenous wages is more profitable for an outsider than for an
insider, it is obvious that this conclusion still holds when a merger results
in a higher wage increase for the merged firm than for the non-merged
firm.
4.2 Bertrand
The pre-merger equilibrium outcome, in terms of wages and profits, is
given by (16)-(17).
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In the asymmetric post-merger Nash equilibrium wages and profits
are given by
wBm =
θ (1− b)κ¡
2 + 4b− 2b2 − θ2b2 − 4b3 − θ2b3 + 2b4
¢ (28)
wB3 =
θ (1− b) (2 + 4b+ 2θb+ 3θb2 − 2b3)¡
2 + 4b− 2b2 − θ2b2 − 4b3 − θ2b3 + 2b4
¢ (29)
πBm =
2 (1− b) (1− θ)2 (1 + b− b2)2 κ2
(1 + 2b) (2 + 2b− b2)2
¡
2 + 4b− 2b2 − θ2b2 − 4b3 − θ2b3 + 2b4
¢2
(30)
πB3 =
(1 + b) (1− b) (1− θ)2 (1 + b− b2)2 (2 + 4b+ 2θb+ 3θb2 − 2b3) 2
(1 + 2b) (2 + 2b− b2)2
¡
2 + 4b− 2b2 − θ2b2 − 4b3 − θ2b3 + 2b4
¢2
(31)
where
κ = 2 + 5b+ θb+ b2 + 2θb2 − 3b3 + θb3 > 0
Then we have the following result:
Lemma 6 wBm > wB3 > wB.
Proof From (28) and (29), and after rearranging, wBm > wB3 reduces
to
θ (1− b) b (1 + b− b2) (1− θ)
2 (1 + b− b2)2 − θ2b2 (1 + b)
> 0.
The numerator is obviously positive for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i. We see that
the denominator is ’least positive’ if θ → 1. Inserting θ = 1 yields
(1− b) (2b+ 1) (2 + 2b− b2) > 0 for b ∈ h0, 1i. Thus the denominator is
also positive for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i. From (16) and (29), wB3 > wB reduces to
θb2 (1− b) (1− θ) (2 + 6b+ 2θ + 5θb+ 2b2 + 3θb2 − 4b3)¡
2 + 4b− 2b2 − θ2b2 − 4b3 − θ2b3 + 2b4
¢
(2 + 3b− 2θb− 2θb2 − b2)
> 0.
It is immediately obvious that the numerator is positive. The denomi-
nator is ’least positive’ if θ → 1. Inserting θ = 1 into the denominator
yields
(3b+ 2) (1− b)2 (2b+ 1)
¡
2 + 2b− b2
¢
> 0
for b ∈ h0, 1i. Thus the denominator is also positive for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i . ¥
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Figure 5: Merger profitability with firm-specific unions under Bertrand
competition.
As was the case with Cournot competition, we find that post-merger
wages increase, and the merged firm faces a higher wage than the non-
merging firm. The intuition is analogous to the one we reported for the
case with Cournot competition.
Proposition 4 Under Bertrand competition and firm-specific monopoly
unions, a merger is (i) profitable for the participants only if the unions
are suﬃciently employment oriented and if products are suﬃciently close
substitutes, and (ii) more profitable for the outsider than for a partici-
pant.
Proof (i)We know from Lemma 1 that πBm > 2πB for b ∈ h0, 1i when
θ = 0. By comparing (30) and (17), it can be shown that πBm − 2πB = 0
for θ, b ∈ h0, 1i. In Figure 5 we have plotted the curve πBm − 2πB = 0
in a (θ, b)-diagram. Obviously, πBm > 2πB in the South-East part of the
Figure.
(ii) Combining the results in Lemma 1 and Lemma 6, it is trivial to
see the result in the Proposition. ¥
As shown in Lemma 1, a merger in a setting without unions is always
beneficial for the participants. When wages are endogenous, this is no
longer always true. This is illustrated in Figure 5. The area below the
curve in Figure 5 shows the set of parameter values for which the merger
is profitable for the participants.
Obviously, the wage increase triggered by a merger can result in an
unprofitable merger. If θ is relatively low, the unions are concerned
about losing employment. Consequently, the wage increase due to the
merger is limited. This explains why a merger is more profitable for low
than for high values of θ. If b is relatively large, both the monopolization
20
eﬀect as well as the response from the outsider are strong following a
merger. Both factors tend to be beneficial for the merging firms, which
explains why it is more likely that a merger is profitable for a high than
for a low value of b.
Finally, note that the outsider benefits more from a merger than an
insider. This result is identical to the finding in the received literature.
In our setting the wage increases following a merger, which is larger for
the merging than the non-merging firm, is an additional argument for a
merger being more profitable for an outsider than for an insider.
5 Eﬃcient bargaining
The eﬃcient bargaining model is often used to contrast the results from
monopoly union models. In the monopoly union model, union behaviour
is to a large extent governed by the labor demand function. The eﬃcient
bargaining model, where wage and employment is set in a simultaneous
bargain, is more reminiscent of profit sharing, so we should expect the
profit level of the firm to play an important role in wage determination.
To save space, we will in this section concentrate on the case where
unions are organized at plant level. The analysis of the case of firm
specific unions with eﬃcient bargaining runs along the same broad lines.
In the pre-merger game, each firm-union pair simultaneously agree
on a contract (wi, li), or (wi, pi), depending on whether the mode of
competition is Cournot or Bertrand, that maximizes12h
(wi)
θ (li)
1−θ
iγ
[(pi − wi) li]1−γ (32)
where γ ∈ h0, 1i is a measure of the union’s relative bargaining strength.
We assume that γ is equal for all firm-union pairs.
In the post-merger game, the merged firm bargains with two unions
simultaneously. Using the model for multiunit bargaining developed by
Davidson (1988), eﬃcient bargaining between the merged firm and its
two unions leads to a contract (w1, w2, l1, l2), or (w1, w2, p1, p2), that
solves
max
h
(w1)
θ (l1)
1−θ
iγ h
(p1 − w1) l1 + (p2 − w2) l2 − (bp2 − w2)bl2i1−γ
(33)
max
h
(w2)
θ (l2)
1−θ
iγ h
(p1 − w1) l1 + (p2 − w2) l2 − (bp1 − w1)bl1i1−γ
(34)
12The fall-back payoﬀs in the Nash maximand are set equal to zero.
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where bp1 and bl1 are the price and output, respectively, of good 1 in case
of a bargaining conflict between the merged firm and union 2. And
similarly, bp2 and bl2 are the price and output of good 2 in case of a
bargaining conflict between the merged firm and union 1.
5.1 Cournot
Under Cournot competition, wages and profits in the symmetric pre-
merger Nash equilibrium are given by
wC =
γθ
2− γ + 2b− 2γθb (35)
πC = (1− γ) (1− γθ)
(2− γ + 2b− 2γθb)2
(36)
The post-merger outcome with eﬃcient bargaining at plant level un-
der Cournot competition is the outcome of the following simultaneous
maximization problem:
max
w1,l1
³
(w1)
θ (l1)
1−θ
´γ
((p1 − w1) l1 + (p2 − w2) l2 − (bp2 − w2) l2)1−γ
(37)
max
w2,l2
³
(w2)
θ (l2)
1−θ
´γ
((p1 − w1) l1 + (p2 − w2) l2 − (bp1 − w1) l1)1−γ
(38)
max
w3,l3
³
(w3)
θ (l3)
1−θ
´γ
((p3 − w3) l3)1−γ (39)
where
p1 = 1− l1 − bl2 − bl3
p2 = 1− l2 − bl1 − bl3
p3 = 1− l3 − bl2 − bl1bp2 = 1− l2 − bl3bp1 = 1− l1 − bl3
The equilibrium levels of wages and profits are given by:
wC1 = w
C
2 =
(2− γ + γθb− b) γθ
ϕ (40)
wC3 =
(2− γ) γθ
ϕ (41)
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πCm =
2 (1− γθ) (1− γ + b− γθb) (2− b+ γθb− γ)2
ϕ2 (42)
πC3 =
(1− γ) (1− γθ) (2− γ)2
ϕ2 (43)
where
ϕ = 4b+ 2γ2θb+ 4− 4γθb− 2γb− 4γ − 2b2 + 4γθb2 + γ2 − 2γ2θ2b2 > 0
Then we have the following eﬀect on wages:
Lemma 7 wC3 > wC > wC1 = wC2
Proof From (35) and (41), wC3 > wC reduces to
2γθb2(1−γθ)2
ϕ(2+2b−γ−2γθb) > 0.
We see that this holds for θ, b, γ ∈ h0, 1i. From (35) and (40), wC >
wC1 = w
C
2 reduces to
γθb(2−γ)(1−γθ)
ϕ(2+2b−γ−2γθb) > 0, which is also true for θ, b, γ ∈
h0, 1i. ¥
We see that the eﬀect on wages are identical to what we found with a
monopoly union model, except that now the outsider’s wage will increase
for all combinations of parameter values. However, the driving force
is now somewhat diﬀerent. A merger reduces the profit potential for
the merging firms. This reduces the potential for profit extraction for
the unions in questions. In addition, and analogous to the case in the
monopoly union model, a merger triggers competition between the two
unions. These two eﬀects explain why the wages drop in the merging
firms. The non-merging firm, on the other hand, has a larger profit
potential following merger. Its union’s best response is to increase its
wage.
Proposition 5 Under Cournot competition and eﬃcient bargaining at
plant level a merger is profitable if products are suﬃciently diﬀerenti-
ated. The set of (θ, b)-values for which a merger is profitable increases
with the unions’ relative bargaining strength. A merger is also more prof-
itable for a participant than for the outsider if products are suﬃciently
diﬀerentiated and if the unions have suﬃcient bargaining strength.
Proof Using (36) and (42), it can be shown that πCm − 2πC = 0 for
diﬀerent combinations of θ, b, γ ∈ h0, 1i . In Figure 5 and 6 we have
plotted the curve πCm − 2πC = 0 for γ = 1/4 and γ = 3/4, respectively,
in a (θ, b)-diagram. Obviously, πCm > 2πC in the North-West corner of
the Figures.
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Figure 6: Merger profitability with eﬃcient bargaining at plant level
with ’weak’ unions (γ = 0.25), under Cournot competition.
In a similar way, we can use (42) and (43) to show that πCm−2πC3 = 0
for diﬀerent combinations of θ, b, γ ∈ h0, 1i, see Figure 7 and 8 where
we have plotted πCm = 2πC3 in a (θ, b)-diagram for γ = 1/4 and γ = 3/4,
respectively. ¥
First, note that the results are analogous to the case with a monopoly
union model. In particular, a merger is profitable if the products are
suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. However, now the bargaining strength plays
a role. This is illustrated in Figure 6 and 7, where the profitability of a
merger is plotted for ’weak’ and ’strong’ unions, respectively.
A ’strong’ union implies that the unions have captured a large share
of the profit potential in a firm. Since a merger lowers the profit potential
for the merging firm, it is the unions that suﬀer most from a merger.
This explains why the profitability of the merger is increasing in the
unions’ bargaining strength.
As shown in Lemma 7, a merger triggers a wage reduction for the
merging firms and a wage increase for the non-merging firm. This ex-
plains why a merger can be more profitable for an insider than for an
outsider. But, again, the unions’ relative bargaining strength now play
a role. This is illustrated in Figure 8 and 9. The areas to the left of the
curves in Figures 8 and 9 constitute the set of parameter values for which
a merger is more profitable for an insider than for the outsider when the
unions’ relative bargaining strength is ’weak’ and ’strong’, respectively.
We see that the set of (θ, b)-values for which a merger is more profitable
for the insiders than for the outsider increases with the relative union
power. The reason is that the strong unions in the merging firms incur
a large loss due to a reduction in profit potential following a merger,
thereby preventing the merging firms from suﬀering a loss due to the
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Figure 7: Merger profitability with eﬃcient bargaining at plant level
with ’strong’ unions (γ = 0.75), under Cournot competition.
Figure 8: Insider versus outsider profitability of a merger with eﬃcient
bargaining at plant level with ’weak’ unions (γ = 0.25), under Cournot
competition.
merger.
5.2 Bertrand
If the mode of competition is Bertrand, wages and profits in the sym-
metric pre-merger Nash equilibrium is given by
wB =
θγ (1− b)
(2− γ + γb− 2γθb) (44)
πB = (1− b) (1 + b) (1− γθ) (1− γ)
(1 + 2b) (2− γ + γb− 2γθb)2
(45)
The post-merger outcome with eﬃcient bargaining at plant level un-
der Bertrand competition is the outcome of the following simultaneous
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Figure 9: Insider versus outsider profitability of a merger with eﬃcient
bargaining at plant level with a ’strong’ union (γ = 0.75), under Cournot
competition.
maximization problem:
max
w1,p1
³
(w1)
θ (l1)
1−θ
´γ ³
(p1 − w1) l1 + (p2 − w2) l2 − (p2 − w2)bl2´1−γ
(46)
max
w2,p2
³
(w2)
θ (l2)
1−θ
´γ ³
(p1 − w1) l1 + (p2 − w2) l2 − (p1 − w1)bl1´1−γ
(47)
max
w3,p3
³
(w3)
θ (l3)
1−θ
´γ
((p3 − w3) l3)1−γ (48)
where bl1 is the direct demand for good 1 when only goods 1 and 3 are
produced, and bl2 is the direct demand for good 2 when only goods 2 and
3 are produced.
The equilibrium levels of wages and profits are given by:
wB1 = w
B
2 =
(1− b) (γθb− γ − 2γb+ 3b+ 2) γθ
ψ (49)
wB3 =
(1− b) (2 + 2b2 − 3γb+ 4b+ γθb− γ − 2γb2) γθ
ψ (50)
πBm =
2 (1− γ) (1− γθ) (1− b) (b+ 1)2 (γθb− γ − 2γb+ 3b+ 2)2
(2b+ 1)ψ2
(51)
πB3 =
(1− γθ) (1− b) (1 + b) (1− γ) ν2
(2b+ 1)ψ2
(52)
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where
ν = 2γb2 − 2b2 + 3γb− 4b− γθb+ γ − 2
ψ = γ2 + 5γ2b2θ + 2γ2b3θ − 2γ2θ2b2 − γ2b2 − 2b3γ2 + 2γ2b+ γ2bθ
−6γθb2 − 8γb+ 4b3γ − 2γθb− 2γθb3 − 4γ + 4 + 2b2 + 8b− 2b3
> 0
Then we have the following result:
Lemma 8 wB3 > wB > wB1 = wB2
Proof From (44) and (50), wB3 > w
B reduces to
2 (1− b) γθb2 (1− γ) (1− γθ) (1 + b)
ψ (2 + γb− γ − 2γθb) > 0
which is true for b, θ, γ ∈ h0, 1i. From (44) and (49), wB > wB1 = wB2
reduces to
γθb(1−b)(1−γ)(2+2b+2γb2−γ−γb−2γθb2−2b2)
ψ(2+γb−γ−2γθb) > 0, which is also true
for b, θ, γ ∈ h0, 1i. ¥
As was the case for Cournot competition, the results with an eﬃ-
cient bargaining model mirror the results with a monopoly union model.
However, with Bertrand competition we know that a merger would in-
crease the profit potential for the merger participants. On the other
hand, a merger triggers rivalry between the two unions. The result in
the Lemma shows that the latter eﬀect dominates. The non-merging
firm, though, experiences an increase in profit potential. This explains
why the non-merging firm’s wage increases following a merger.
Proposition 6 Under Bertrand competition and eﬃcient bargaining at
plant level, a merger is always profitable for the participants. Further-
more, a merger is always more profitable for the insiders than for the
outsiders if γ > 1 − 1
3
√
2 ≈ 0.53. For γ < 0.53 a merger is more prof-
itable for a participant than for the outsider if products are suﬃciently
diﬀerentiated.
Proof From Lemma 1 and Lemma 8, the first part of the Proposition
is trivial.
From (51) and (52) πBm − 2πB3 reduces to
2b (1− γ) (1− γθ) (1− b) (1 + b)D
(2b+ 1) γ4E2 > 0
where D = −5γ2b+2γ−8γ2b2−γ2−7b2+2γθb+ γ2θ2b2+2γθb2− 3b+
10γb+ 16γb2 − 4b3 − 4b3γ2 + 8γb3. We see that πBm > 2πB3 iﬀ D > 0. A
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closer inspection of D reveals that D is decreasing in b and increasing
in θ. Setting b = 1 and θ = 0 yields D = −18γ2 + 36γ − 14, and solving
for γ yields γ = 1 − 1
3
√
2 ≈ 0.53. Thus if γ > 0.53, then D > 0 for
b, θ ∈ h0, 1i. ¥
Given the results in Lemma 8, the results in the Proposition is
straight forward to understand. The changes in wages triggered by the
merger are the driving force behind the changes in profits for insiders
and outsiders following a merger.
Summing up the analysis for eﬃcient bargaining, we see that the
strength of the union matters for how much the wage drops. However,
in broad terms the results mirror those from the monopoly unions. There
is — with plant-specific unions — a tendency that wages drop when the
number of firms in an oligopoly drops. This makes mergers more prof-
itable than in the absence of unions, and it may become more profitable
to be an insider to the merger than an outsider, contrary to what stan-
dard theory predicts.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that unions matter for the profitability of
a merger, and that even union structure is of large importance. While
plant-specific unions tend to increase the profitability of a merger and
may even make it more profitable to take part in a merger than being an
outsider, the results are reversed in a setting with firm-specific unions.
Our results suggest that firms considering to merge in a unionized
oligopoly should be concerned about how the unions respond to a pos-
sible merger. The existence of plant-specific unions is an argument in
favour of a merger, from firms’ point of view. In contrast to the re-
ceived literature, there is no free-rider problem. On the contrary, each
merging firm may gain more than a non-merging firm and there are thus
incentives to merge rather than wait and hope that other firms should
merge.
This paper has not contained a welfare theoretic analysis that could
guide anti-trust policy. We here only oﬀer some intuitive speculations.
On the one hand, with plant-specific unions there will be a tendency
to lower wages. The price increase following a merger then is damp-
ened, making the merger less of a problem from a competition policy
viewpoint. On the other hand, the wage decrease can trigger a higher
number of profitable mergers that harm competition. For firm-specific
unions, the arguments are reversed.
Finally, we think our results could guide future empirical research
on the wage eﬀects of mergers. The results in the received empirical
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literature are mixed. Some find support for a wage increase following
a merger, some for a wage cut, while others find no eﬀect at all.13 If
one in the same data material combines mergers with plant-specific and
firm-specific unions, one might find that mergers have - if any - only a
limited eﬀect on wages. According to our results the underlying truth
could be that some mergers result in wage drops while others give wage
rises. A proper empirical test should then start with a detailed study of
the union structure which, in turn, should lead to a discrimination in the
data material between industries with plant- and firm-specific unions.
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